Public bodies themselves become monopolies, possibly exercising greater power than those existing under private enterprises, and their economic policies often vacillate due to the long-term planning programmes in place for future developments. In any case, it is argued, the government can act through subsidies, taxation, planning regulations and, if necessary, by means of compulsory purchase to ensure that land is secured for public uses and externalities are provided for. This will allow under-utilized land resources to be allocated by a decentralized decision-making process.

Of course, such an allocation is only efficient if a single price rules for the entire land in the market, and when private and public uses have to compete on equal terms. Usually, however, proposals for nationalization always envisage public bodies to acquire land at a lower price than that offered by the private developers. But the paradox is that the villas and apartments in Kerala doled out by the Builders in Kerala do have more takers than those on offer from the government housing boards. Here we can examine the dual-pricing system, by looking at it in terms of what was proposed under the Community Land Act.

The planning case for the public ownership of land rests mainly on the advantages enjoyed by a public body in assembling large land areas for comprehensive development rather than by allowing development to proceed piecemeal in response to the demand from the market forces as individual sites become unavailable. But when analyzing the proposals in the Community Land Act, the argument is not wholly convincing. In most cases, wherever the government controlled Housing Boards took up housing development, they always acquired land at prices that is far below the market value for land prevailing in those destinations.